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1 Introduction
Two-sided, many-to-one models have been used to study assignment prob-
lems where agents can be divided, from the very beginning, into two disjoint
subsets. One contains institutions like rms, hospitals, colleges, sororities,
orchestras, schools, clubs, etc. The other includes individuals like workers,
medical interns, students, musicians, children, sportsmen, etc. The funda-
mental question of these assignment problems consists of matching each rm,
on one side, with a group of workers, on the other side.1 Stability has been
considered the main property to be satised by any sensible matching. A
matching is called stable if all agents have acceptable partners and there is
no unmatched worker-rm pair who both would prefer to be matched to each
other rather than staying with their current partners. To give all blocking
power to only individual agents and worker-rm pairs seems a weak require-
ment. Moreover, in many cases it may be the right solution concept since,
to destroy an individually rational unstable matching, only a telephone call
(or a couple of e-mails) is required.
The college admissions model with substitutable preferences is the
name given by Roth and Sotomayor [9] to the most general many-to-one
model with ordinal preferences. Firms are restricted to having substitutable
preferences over subsets of workers; namely, all rms continue to want to em-
ploy a worker even if other workers become unavailable.2 Under this hypoth-
esis Roth and Sotomayor [9] showed that the deferred-acceptance algorithms
produce either the rm-optimal stable matching or the worker-optimal stable
matching, depending on whether the rms or the workers make the o¤ers.
The rm (worker)-optimal stable matching is unanimously considered by all
rms (respectively, workers) to be the best among all stable matchings.
A more specic many-to-one model, called the college admissions prob-
lemby Gale and Shapley [1], supposes that rms (colleges) have a maximum
number of positions to be lled (their quota), and that each rm (college),
given its ranking of individual workers (students), orders subsets of workers
in a responsive manner; namely, for any two subsets that di¤er in only one
1We will follow the convention of generically referring to institutions as rms and to
individuals as workers. See Roth and Sotomayor [9] for an illuminating and comprehensive
survey of this literature as well as an exhaustive bibliography.
2Kelso and Crawford [4] were the rst to use this property in a more general model
with money. They proved the existence of a stable matching and of a rm-optimal stable
matching (all rms agree it is the best stable matching).
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student a college prefers the subset containing the most-preferred student.
In this model the set of stable matchings satises the following additional
properties: (1) There is a polarization of interests between the two sides of
the market along the set of stable matchings. (2) The set of unmatched
agents is the same under every stable matching. (3) The number of workers
assigned to a rm through stable matchings is the same. (4) If a rm does
not complete its quota under some stable matching then it gets the same set
of workers at any stable matching.3
The purpose of this note is twofold. On the one hand, its negative side: we
exhibit examples with rms having substitutable preferences in which prop-
erties (1) to (4) are violated. On the other hand, its positive side: we propose
a set of axioms on rms preferences (opposite optimality, acceptability, and
desirability) under which properties (2), (3), and (4) hold. Moreover, we
identify a weaker condition than q responsiveness, called separability with
quota, or q separability, that together with substitutability imply the set
of axioms. We also show that these restricted preferences do not guarantee
that property (1) holds (see Example 2). A rm is said to have separable
preferences over all subsets of workers if its partition between acceptable and
unacceptable workers has the property that only adding acceptable workers
makes any given subset of workers a better one. However, in many appli-
cations as the entry-level professional labor markets, separability alone does
not seem very reasonable because rms usually have much smaller number
of openings (their quota) than that there are goodworkers looking for a
job. In those cases it seems reasonable to restrict rm preferences in such
a way that the separability condition operates only up to their quota, con-
sidering unacceptable all subsets with higher cardinality. Moreover, while
responsiveness seems the relevant property for extending an ordered list of
individual students to preferences on all subsets of students, it is too restric-
tive, though, to capture some degree of complementarity among workers,
which can be very natural in other settings. The q separability condition
permits greater exibility in going from orders on individuals to orders on
subsets. For instance, candidates for a job can be grouped together by areas
of specialization. A rm with quota two may consider as the best subset of
workers not the set consisting of the rst two candidates on the individual
3Property (1) is a consequence of the decomposition lemma proved by Gale and So-
tomayor [2] and [3]. Properties (2) and (3) were proved independently by Gale and So-
tomayor [2] and [3] and Roth [5]. Property (4) was proved by Roth [7].
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ranking (which may have both the same specialization) but rather the subset
composed of the rst and fourth candidates in the individual ranking (i.e.;
the rst in each area of specialization).
In the next section we present the notation and denitions. Section 3
contains the results and the main examples.
2 Notation and denitions
There are two disjoint sets of agents, the set of n rms F and the set of
m workers W. Each rm F 2 F has a strict, transitive, and complete
preference relation P (F ) over 2W , and each worker w 2 W has a strict,
transitive, and complete preference relation P (w) over F [ f;g. Preferences
proles are (n+m)-tuples of preference relations and they are represented by
P = (P (F1) ; :::; P (Fn) ;P (w1) ; :::; P (wm)). Given a preference relation of a
rm P (F ) the subsets of workers preferred to the empty set by F are called
acceptable. Similarly, given a preference relation of a worker P (w) the rms
preferred by w to the empty set are called acceptable. To express preference
relations in a concise manner, and since only acceptable partners will matter,
we will represent preference relations as lists of acceptable partners. We will
denote by P a generic subset of preferences proles.
The assignment problem consists of matching workers with rms keeping
the bilateral nature of their relationship and allowing for the possibility that
both, rms and workers, may remain unmatched. Formally,
Denition 1 A matching  is a mapping from the set F [W into the set
of all subsets of F [W such that for all w 2 W and F 2 F :
1. Either j (w) j = 1 and  (w)  F or else  (w) = ;:
2.  (F ) 2 2W .
3.  (w) = F if and only if w 2  (F ).
We say that w and F are single in a matching  if  (w) = ; and  (F ) =
;. Otherwise, they are matched. A matching  is said to be one-to-one
if rms can hire at most one worker; namely, condition 2 is replaced by:
Either j (F )j = 1 and  (F )  W or else  (F ) = ;. The model in which
3
all matchings are one-to-one is also known in the literature as the marriage
model. We will follow the widespread notation where
 =

F1 F2 F3 ;
fw3; w4g fw1g ; fw2g

represents the obvious matching betweenF = fF1; F2; F3g andW = fw1; w2; w3; w4g.
Given a set of workers S  W, let Ch (S; P (F )) denote rm Fs most-
preferred subset of S according to its preference ordering P (F ). A matching
 is blocked by a worker w if ;P (w) (w). Similarly,  is blocked by a rm F
if  (F ) 6= Ch ( (F ) ; P (F )). We say that a matching is individually rational
if it is not blocked by any individual agent. A matching  is blocked by a
worker-rm pair (w;F ) if FP (w) (w) and w 2 Ch ( (F ) [ fwg ; P (F )).
Denition 2 A matching  is stable if it is not blocked by any individual
agent or any rm-worker pair.
Given a preference prole P , denote the set of stable matchings by S (P ).
It is easy to construct examples of preference proles P with the property
that the set S (P ) is empty. This is the reason why the literature has focused
on the restriction where workers are regarded as substitutes.
Denition 3 A rm Fs preference ordering P (F ) satises substitutabil-
ity if for any set S containing workers w and w (w 6= w), if w 2 Ch (S; P (F ))
then w 2 Ch (Sn f wg ; P (F )).
A preference prole P is substitutable if for each rm F , the preference
ordering P (F ) satises substitutability. The literature has also studied sub-
sets of preferences where rms (workers) unanimously agree that a matching
F (W) is the best stable matching. That is why F and W are called,
respectively, the rms-optimal stable matching and the workers-optimal sta-
ble matching.4 Moreover, there is an opposition of interests on these two
optimal stable matchings. We state both properties as an axiom on sets of
preferences proles P.
(OO) The set P satises opposite optimality if for all P 2 P there exist
F ; W 2 S (P ) such that for all  2 S (P ) and all F andw: FR (F )R (F )W
and WR (w)R (w)F .
4We are following the convention of extending preferences from the original sets (2W
and F [ f;g) to the set of matchings. However, we now have to consider weak orderings
since the matchings  and 0 may associate the same partner with an individual. These
orderings will be denoted by R (F ) and R (w).
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Remark 1 The set of substitutable preferences satises opposite optimality.
We will also concentrate on subsets of preferences satisfying the axiom
that, in a stable matching, rms only hire individually acceptable workers.
(A) The set P satises acceptability if for all P 2 P and all  2 S (P ):
w 2  (F ) implies wP (F ) ;.
We will assume that each rm F has a maximum number of positions to
be lled: its quota qF . This limitation may arise from, for example, techno-
logical, legal, or budgetary reasons. We will denote by q = (qF )F2F the list
of quotas and we will focus on the axiom saying that if a rm does not ll
its quota it is willing to hire an acceptable worker. Formally,
(D) The set P satises q desirability if for all P 2 P, all  2 S (P ), and
all F 2 F : j (F )j < qF and wP (F ) ; imply w 2 Ch ( (F ) [ fwg ; P (F )).
We now dene the set of q separable and q responsive preferences. A
rm F has q separable preferences if the division between good workers
(wP (F ) ;) and bad workers (;P (F )w) guides, up to his quota, the ordering
of subsets in the sense that adding a good worker leads to a better set, while
adding a bad worker leads to a worse set. Formally,
Denition 4 A rm Fs preference ordering P (F ) is qF separable if: (a)
for all S (W such that jSj < qF and w =2 S we have that (S [ fwg)P (F )S
if and only if wP (F );, and (b) ;P (F )S for all S such that jSj > qF .5
Remark 2 The set of q separable preferences satises acceptability and q desirability.
Following Roth and Sotomayor [9], a rm Fs preference ordering P (F )
(over all subsets of workers) is said to be qF responsive ( to its ordering over
individual workers) if it is qF separable and for any two sets of workers that
di¤er in only one worker, F prefers the subset containing the most-preferred
worker. Formally,
Denition 5 A rm Fs preference ordering P (F ) over sets of workers is
qF responsive if it is qF separable and for all S, w0 2 S, and w =2 S we
have that (Sn fw0g [ fwg)P (F )S if and only if wP (F )w0.
5For the purpose of studying the set of stable matchings, condition (b) in this denition
could be replaced by the following condition: jCh (S; P (F ))j  qF for all S such that
jSj > qF . We choose condition (b) since it is simpler. Sönmez [10] used an alternative
approach that consists of deleting condition (b) in the denition but then requiring in the
denition of a matching that j (F )j  qF for all F 2 F .
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A preference prole P is q separable if each P (F ) is qF separable. Sim-
ilarly, P is q responsive if each P (F ) is qF responsive. In principle, we may
have rms with di¤erent quotas. The case where all rms have 1 separable
preferences is equivalent, from the point of view of stability, to the one-to-one
model. Hence, our set-up includes the marriage model as a particular case.
The following ordering over 2W , where W = fw1; w2; w3; w4g,
P (F ) = fw1; w2g; fw3; w4g ; fw1; w3g; fw1; w4g ; fw2; w3g; fw2; w4g ;
fw1g; fw2g; fw3g; fw4g
illustrates the fact that q separability does not imply substitutability. To see
this, notice that P (F ) is 2 separable but it is not substitutable since w1 2
Ch (fw1; w2; w3; w4g ; P (F )), but w1 =2 Ch (fw1; w3; w4g ; P (F )). However,
it is easy to see that all (m  1) separable as well as all qF responsive
preferences are substitutable. As a consequence of this later inclusion we
have that S (P ) 6= ; if P is q responsive. The ordering
P (F 0) = fw1; w3g; fw1; w2g; fw2; w3g; fw1g; fw2g; fw3g
illustrates the fact that the set of q responsive preferences is a proper subset
of the set of q separable and substitutable preferences.
The following example shows that even if all rms have qseparable pref-
erences the set of stable matchings may be empty.
Example 1 Let F = fF1; F2g andW = fw1; w2; w3; w4g be the two sets of
agents with a prole of preferences P dened by
P (F1) = fw3; w4g; fw2; w4g ; fw1; w2g; fw1; w3g; fw2; w3g; fw1; w4g; fw1g;
fw2g; fw3g; fw4g ,
P (F2) = fw3g; fw4g,
P (w1) = F1,
P (w2) = F1,
P (w3) = F1; F2, and
P (w4) = F2; F1.
Notice that P is (2; 1) separable. However, it is a matter of verication to
see that S (P ) = ;.
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3 Results and examples
In the marriage model the decomposition lemma says that both sides of the
market are in conict on the set of stable matchings in the sense that the
partners (through any stable matching 1) of the subset of agents of one
side of the market that consider 1 to be at least as good as the stable
matching 2, have to consider 2 to be at least as good as 1. In particular
(and we referred to it in the Introduction as Property (1)), if all agents of
one side of the market consider the stable matching 1 to be at least as
good as the stable matching 2 then all agents of the other side have to
consider 2 to be at least as good as 1. For the college admissions model
with q responsive preferences the decomposition lemma can be obtained by
using the following result of Roth and Sotomayor [8]: For any given pair
of stable matchings 1 and 2, if rm F prefers 1 (F ) to 2 (F ) then it
prefers every worker in 1 (F ) to any worker in 2 (F ) n1 (F ). This result
also implies that the set of stable matchings depends only on how rms order
individual workers and not on their specic responsive extensions. Roth [6]
gives an example where the decomposition lemma is not true in a many-
to-one model with money and substitutable preferences. Example 2 below
shows that the decomposition lemma does not hold in our more restricted
framework of ordinal, q separable, and substitutable preferences.
Example 2 Let F = fF1; F2g andW = fw1; w2; w3; w4g be the two sets of
agents with the (2; 2) separable and substitutable prole of preferences P
dened by
P (F1) = fw1; w2g; fw1; w3g; fw2; w4g; fw3; w4g; fw1; w4g; fw2; w3g; fw1g; fw2g;
fw3g; fw4g ,
P (F2) = fw3; w4g; fw2; w4g; fw1; w3g; fw1; w2g; fw1; w4g; fw2; w3g; fw1g; fw2g;
fw3g; fw4g ,
P (w1) = F2; F1,
P (w2) = F2; F1,
P (w3) = F1; F2, and
P (w4) = F1; F2.
The set of stable matchings consists of the following four matchings:
F =

F1 F2
fw1; w2g fw3; w4g

,
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1 =

F1 F2
fw1; w3g fw2; w4g

,
2 =

F1 F2
fw2; w4g fw1; w3g

, and
W =

F1 F2
fw3; w4g fw1; w2g

.
Notice that FP (F )1P (F )2P (F )W for all F and
WR (w1)2P (w1)1R (w1)F ,
WR (w2)1P (w2)2R (w2)F ,
WR (w3)1P (w3)2R (w3)F , and
WR (w4)2P (w4)1R (w4)F .
Therefore, 1 is strictly preferred to 2 by F1, F2, and w2.
We turn now to establish the fact that under axioms (OO), (A), and
(D) (and therefore, under q separable and substitutable preferences) prop-
erties (2), (3), and (4) hold. These are important properties; for instance, if
property (2) does not hold it means that a singleagent would be able to
argue that he was badly treated by a particular stable matching. Remember
that they also hold in both the marriage and the college admission models.
This is in spite of the fact that their proofs in these models, according to
Roth and Sotomayor [9], are a simple consequence of the decomposition
lemmawhich does not hold in our setting. Moreover, the structure of the
set of stable matchings coincides in the marriage and the college admission
models. This is because one can identify each rm F with qF identical rms
and any many-to-one matching  with the one-to-one matching  where each
w 2  (F ) is matched through  with one of the qF replica of F . However, as
soon as preferences are not q responsive, the properties of the set of stable
matchings have to be proven directly without relying on the properties of the
marriage model.
Proposition 1 Assume P satises axioms (OO), (A), and (D) and let
P 2 P. If w is single in  2 S (P ), then w is single in any 0 2 S (P ) :
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Proof. Suppose the contrary; that is, there exist w, bF , and ; 0 2 S (P )
such that  ( w) = ; and 0 ( w) = bF . By (OO), there exist matchings F
and W that are the worst and the best stable matchings, respectively, for
all workers. Therefore, we can also nd a rm F such that w 2 W( F ) and
w =2 SF F(F ). We will distinguish between two cases:
Case 1:
S
F F(F ) 
S
F W(F ). In this caseX
F
jF(F )j <
X
F
jW(F )j 
X
F
qF , (1)
where the strict inequality follows because w =2 SF F(F ). Then, F( ~F ) <
q ~F for at least one ~F . Denote by eF the set of all such rms. We claim
that there exists F0 2 eF such that W(F0)nF(F0) 6= ;, because otherwise,
W(F )  F(F ) for all F 2 eF would implyX
F
jW (F )j =
[
F
W(F )
 = [
F2 eF W(F )
+ [
F =2 eF W(F )


[
F2 eF F(F )
+ [
F =2 eF W(F )


[
F2 eF F(F )
+ [
F =2 eF F(F )

=
[
F
F(F )
 =X
F
jF (F )j
which contradicts (1). Let w0 2 W(F0)nF(F0). Then, the pair (w0; F0)
blocks F , since we have that w0 =2 F (F0), F0 = W(w0)P (w0)F(w0), and
w0 2 Ch (F(F0) [ fw0g ; P (F0)) . (2)
Condition (2) holds because jF(F0)j < qF0 and w0 2 W(F0) imply, by (A)
and (D), that w0P (F0);. Therefore, Case 1 is false.
Case 2:
S
F F(F ) *
S
F W(F ). In this case, there exists a worker
~w 2 SF F(F )nSF W(F ). Hence, we can nd ~F such that ~w 2 F( ~F ) while
~w =2 SF W(F ). But, this says that by (OO), W( ~w) = ;P ( ~w)F( ~w) = ~F ,
which contradicts that F is individually rational for ~w.
Proposition 2 below states that properties (3) and (4) also hold under our
set of axioms (remember that they hold for the college admissions model).
Proposition 2 Assume P satises axioms (OO), (A), and (D). Then, for
all P 2 P, all pairs ; 0 2 S (P ) ; and all F 2 F :
(a) j (F )j = j0 (F )j.
(b) If j (F )j < qF then  (F ) = 0 (F ).
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Proof. To prove (a) we will show that if  2 S (P ) then j (F )j = jW (F )j
for all F 2 F . Assume the contrary; that is, suppose there exist  2 S (P )
and F 2 F such that j (F )j 6= jW (F )j.
Case 1: Assume jW (F )j > j (F )j holds. It means that there exist w 2
W (F ) n (F ). Therefore,
w =2  (F ) : (3)
By (OO) we have that
F = W (w)P (w) (w) : (4)
By (A) and w 2 W (F ) we have that wP (F ) ;, which implies, by (D), that
w 2 Ch ( (F ) [ fwg ; P (F )) (5)
since j (F )j < qF . Therefore, conditions (3), (4), and (5) imply that  is
not stable since (w;F ) blocks it.
Case 2: Assume jW (F )j < j (F )j holds. We claim that we can nd F^ 2 F
such that
(F^ ) < W(F^ ), otherwise the number of workers matched at 
would be greater than the number of workers matched at W , contradicting
Proposition 1. Applying Case 1 to F^ we conclude that  is not stable.
To prove (b) suppose that  2 S (P ) and j (F )j < qF for some F 2 F .
By (a) we have that jW (F )j = j (F )j < qF holds. It is su¢ cient to show
that  (F ) = W (F ) : To get a contradiction let w 2 W (F ) n (F ) and, by
Proposition 1, let F 0 6= F be such that
w 2  (F 0) : (6)
Using (A) we obtain that wP (F ) ; and (OO) implies that
W (w) = FP (w)F
0 =  (w) . (7)
Therefore, wP (F ) ; and j (F )j < qF imply, by (D), that
w 2 Ch ( (F ) [ fwg ; P (F )) : (8)
Conditions (6), (7), and (8) imply that (w;F ) blocks .
Since Proposition 2 implies that the set of unmatched rms is the same
in all stable matchings, we can state the following Corollary.
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Corollary 3 Assume rms have q separable and substitutable preferences.
Then, the set of unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching.
Examples 3, 4, 5, and 6 below show that the statement of Corollary 3 is
false without either q-separability or substitutability.
Example 3 Let F = fF1; F2g andW = fw1; w2; w3; w4g be the two sets of
agents with a substitutable prole of preferences P dened by
P (F1) = fw1; w2g; fw1; w3g; fw2; w4g; fw3; w4g; fw1g; fw2g; fw3g; fw4g ,
P (F2) = fw3g; fw1; w2g; fw1g ; fw2g; fw4g,
P (w1) = F2; F1,
P (w2) = F2; F1,
P (w3) = F1; F2, and
P (w4) = F1; F2.
The ordering P (F2) is not qF2-separable and any P containing P would
violate axiom (D) for any qF2  1. The two optimal stable matchings
F =

F1 F2 ;
fw1; w2g fw3g fw4g

and
W =

F1 F2
fw3; w4g fw1; w2g

have the property that F (w4) = ; and W (w4) = F1.
Example 4 Let F = fF1; F2g and W = fw1; w2; w3; w4; w5g be the two
sets of agents with the (2; 2) separable prole of preferences P dened by
P (F1) = fw1; w2g; fw3; w4g; fw1; w3g; fw1; w4g; fw2; w3g; fw2; w4g; fw1g; fw2g;
fw3g; fw4g ,
P (F2) = fw3; w5g; fw1; w2g; fw1; w3g; fw1; w5g; fw2; w3g; fw2; w5g; fw1g; fw2g;
fw3g; fw5g ,
P (w1) = F2; F1,
P (w2) = F2; F1,
P (w3) = F1; F2,
P (w4) = F1; F2, and
P (w5) = F2.
Notice that P (F1) is not substitutable and the following two stable matchings
1 =

F1 F2 ;
fw1; w2g fw3; w5g fw4g

and
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2 =

F1 F2 ;
fw3; w4g fw1; w2g fw5g

have di¤erent single workers. Any P containing P would violate axiom (OO)
since W does not exit and 1 = F is not the worst stable matching for w5.
Example 5 Let F = fF1; F2; F3g and W = fw1; w2; w3; w4g be the two
sets of agents with a substitutable prole of preferences P dened by
P (F1) = fw1; w2g; fw1; w3g; fw1; w4g; fw2; w3g; fw2; w4g; fw3; w4g; fw1g; fw2g;
fw3g; fw4g ,
P (F2) = fw3g; fw1; w3g; fw2; w3g; fw1; w2g; fw1g; fw2g,
P (F3) = fw4g ,
P (w1) = F2; F1,
P (w2) = F2; F1,
P (w3) = F1; F2, and
P (w4) = F1; F3.
The ordering P (F2) is not qF2-separable and anyP containing P would violate
axiom (D) for any qF2  1. The two optimal stable matchings
F =

F1 F2 F3
fw1; w2g fw3g fw4g

and
W =

F1 F2 F3
fw3; w4g fw1; w2g ;

have the property that F (F3) 6= ; and W (F3) = ;.
Example 6 Let F = fF1; F2; F3g andW = fw1; w2; w3; w4; w5g be the two
sets of agents with a (2; 2; 2) separable prole of preferences P dened by
P (F1) = fw1; w2g; fw3; w5g; fw2; w5g; fw1; w5g; fw1; w3g; fw2; w3g; fw1g;
fw2g ; fw3g; fw5g ,
P (F2) = fw3; w4g; fw1; w2g; fw2; w4g; fw1; w4g; fw1; w3g; fw2; w3g; fw3g ;
fw1; w2g ; fw1g ; fw2g ; fw3g ; fw4g ,
P (F3) = fw5g ,
P (w1) = F2; F1,
P (w2) = F2; F1,
P (w3) = F1; F2,
P (w4) = F2, and
P (w5) = F1; F3.
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Notice that P (F2) is not substitutable and the two stable matchings
1 =

F1 F2 F3
fw1; w2g fw3; w4g fw5g

and
2 =

F1 F2 F3 ;
fw3; w5g fw1; w2g ; fw4g

have the property that F3 is single in 2 but matched in 1. Any P containing
P would violate axiom (OO) since W does not exist and 1 = F is not the
worst stable matching for w4.
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